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1 Bernard E. Harcourt

NEOLIBERAL PENALITY:
THE BIRTH OF NATURAL ORDER,
THE ILLUSION OF FREE MARKETS
Bernard E. Harcourt
The major function of criminal law in a capitalist society
is to prevent people from bypassing the system of
voluntary, compensated exchange—the “market,” explicit
or implicit—in situations where, because transaction
costs are low, the market is a more efficient method of
allocating resources than forced exchange… When
transaction costs are low, the market is, virtually by
definition, the most efficient method of allocating
resources. Attempts to bypass the market will therefore be
discouraged by a legal system bent on promoting
efficiency.
Richard Posner (1985)

Preface

We face today one of the greatest financial crises in Western capitalism.
The collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, the nationalization
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the federal bailouts of A.I.G. and
Washington Mutual, the fire sale of Merrill Lynch, and the ongoing
federal rescue program all attest to the magnitude of our current crisis.
In this sense, the timing of this essay—the culmination of over
two years of ongoing historical research—could hardly be worse. The
central premise of the essay is that most people in the United States
believe that the market is the most efficient mechanism to allocate
resources. The events of 2008 challenge this central premise and are
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forcing the American people, more than ever, to reexamine the need for
the regulation of the free market.
In another sense, however, the timing of this essay is, sadly,
perfect. Perfect because its purpose is precisely to question the meaning
of the very phrase “the need for the regulation of the free market” and to
suggest that it is the belief in the duality of those two central terms—
regulation and free market—that is one of the greatest problems we face
today. The terms, as well as their companion expressions, “market
efficiency,” “natural order,” “self-adjusting markets,” etc., are illusory
and misleading categories that fail to capture the individual
distinctiveness of different forms of market organization and mask the
redistributions of wealth that characterize our peculiar mode of market
organization.
This essay asks the question, what work do these categories of
“natural order” and “market efficiency” do for us? What do we achieve
when we distribute regulatory market mechanisms into the two
categories—the free and the constrained—and then judge them on that
basis alone? The answer: We have developed these categories in order to
place what are in fact irreducibly individual phenomena in a coherent
frame and to deploy simplistic heuristic devices to expedite our
evaluation of different forms of economic organization. In the process,
we have created categories that are responsible, first, for facilitating our
growing penal sphere, and, second, for naturalizing and thereby masking
the redistributive consequences associated with different methods of
organizing markets.
The idea of natural order, born in the eighteenth century, is
precisely what gave birth to neoliberal penality, a discourse on economy
and society in which the government is pushed out of the economic
sphere, relegated to the boundary, and given free rein there—and there
alone—to expand, intervene, and punish, often severely. The concept of
market efficiency also naturalizes and thereby hides the choices,
policies, norms, regulations, and laws that we use to administer markets,
and as a consequence, makes us not analyze neutrally and openmindedly the mechanisms that regulate the market.
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The ultimate aspiration of this essay is to cease using those
terms—natural order, market efficiency, the free market, or even
regulated markets—and instead begin the arduous task of evaluating
different proposals for the organization of society based on a meticulous
comparison of the distributional effects associated with competing
mechanisms necessary to supervise and administer a system of economic
and social exchange.
The story begins, though, very far away in time and place, in the
Parisian markets of the eighteenth century, with the establishment of the
lieutenant générale de police du Châtelet de Paris and the “police” of
bakers, grain merchants, and markets.

I.

In early May 1739, commissioner Emmanuel Nicolas Parisot was doing
his rounds in the Marais. As the investigator, examiner, and royal
counselor responsible for the Saint-Antoine district, Parisot reported to
René Hérault, lieutenant général de police at the Châtelet of Paris, the
royal palace of justice. Parisot was at the Saint-Paul market going from
baker to baker, weighing their bread, when he discovered at Jean
Thyou’s stand “four three-pound breads each light one-and-a-half
ounces.”1 At about the same time, commissioner Charles, also doing his
rounds, discovered at Courtois’ bakery on rue de Chantre “one bread
labeled eight pounds in weight, light two ounces, two others marked the
same weight one ounce light each, six labeled four pounds in weight
each one ounce off, another six pound bread light one ounce and a half,
two others labeled six pounds in weight, eight others marked four pounds
in weight, all a half ounce light.”2 Another commissioner, Delespinay,
found a cache of underweight breads in a small room hidden in the back
of Aublay’s bakery shop on the vieille rue du Temple. Delespinay
immediately seized the bread and had it sent to the Sisters of the Charity
of the Saint-Gervais parish.3 (Commissioner Charles had sent his
confiscated bread to the Capuchin friars on the rue Saint Honoré and to
1

Freminville 1758 :78.
Freminville 1758 : 78-79.
3
Freminville 1758 :79.
2
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the poor at the parish of Saint-Germain l’Auxerrois.)4 When the
lieutenant de police held court the following May 5th, 1739, Hérault
condemned the bakers but showed mercy and “this time only” sentenced
each to only fifty livres in fines.5
Later the same month, the 29th of May, master baker Amand, an
elected syndic in charge of his community of master bakers, found
himself accused of selling a loaf of bread in his shop—specifically, “one
white bread weighing four pounds, at eleven sols”—at a higher price
than market—to be exact, “three deniers for each pound above the
common market price.”6 Hérault declared Amand guilty, fined him three
hundred livres, and stripped him of his elected office. In the sentencing
order, Hérault ordered the other syndics to assemble within three days of
the publication of his sentence and to proceed in their office to the
election of a new syndic.7 A week earlier, Hérault had convicted MarieHebert Heguin of buying grain at market for resale and fined her 1,000
livres.8 A royal ordinance prohibited buying grain with the intention of
reselling it: “It is permitted to purchase grain at market for one’s use;
however, it is not permitted to buy grain for resale: the reason, very
simply, is that he who buys for purposes of resale must necessarily gain
from the transaction and, as a result, will sell it at a higher price than
market rate, which constitutes a punishable monopoly.”9
It is in these terms that Me. Edme de la Poix de Freminville
described the Parisian grain markets in his Dictionnaire ou traité de la
police générale published in 1758, in which he collected, assembled,
organized, classified, reported and reprinted a myriad of these sentences
and royal ordinances. A manual of policing, a compendium of
disciplinary practices, Freminville’s dictionary codified alphabetically a
gamut of rules and prescriptions covering not only subsistence—grains,
bread, meats, fish, poultry, oysters, and legumes—but also gaming,
sanitation, religious practice, guilds, sexual mores, even the charivaria.
4

Freminville 1758 :79.
Freminville 1758 :79.
6
Freminville 1758 :73.
7
Freminville 1758 :73.
8
Freminville 1758:502.
9
Freminville 1758 :501. This ordinance was also enforced by sentences on July 8,
1740, and August 11, 1741 – fining for 1,000 livres. See Freminville 1758 :503-505.
5
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Advertised as a “Work necessary to all officers of the police and officers
of justice, where they will find each and every one of their obligations
and functions classified by each term, necessary as well to all
prosecutors and practicing attorneys; & equally useful to priests,
churchwardens, … merchants, … & others,”10 the dictionary contained
564 pages of the most minute regulation of, well, practically everything.
Freminville was intimately familiar with these ordinances.
Himself a bailli for the village and surroundings of Lapalisse in the
Auvergne region of central France, Freminville had similar magisterial
powers in his countryside as a lieutenant général de police would have
had in Paris.11 Freminville published his dictionary more than fifty years
after the first volume of Delamare’s famous Traité de Police had
appeared in 1705—the first of four massive in-folio tomes documenting
and tracing in intricate detail the history of the police of Paris.
Freminville, though, targeted a wider audience with his dictionary.
Whereas Delamare had written for the urban police officer—especially
the Parisian police administrator—Freminville pitched his treatise to the
far more numerous country magistrates and prosecutors—the many
procureurs fiscaux, who resided in each village in France and
administered the police function, meting out justice and regulating all
aspects of daily life. By alphabetizing the rules and making them
available in a more concise, single volume, in-quarto, Freminville sought
to disseminate the disciplinary rules further, to publicize them, to make
them known—in their finest detail.12

10

Freminville 1758 :i (cover page).
A bailli was the functional equivalent of a lieutenant général de police or an English
sheriff in more rural areas outside of Paris. It was an office retained important
regulatory and administrative functions throughout the ancient régime—including the
authority to set market prices. See generally Olivier-Martin 1988:66-73. For a
biographical entry on Freminville, see des Essarts 1800, vol.3, p. 153-154.
12
Freminville prefaces his work with an acknowledgement to Delamare’s famous
treatise, all the while signaling the broader reach of his own text and the greater
practicality or applicability of his treatise:« Il semblerait qu’après le Traité de Police de
M. de Lamare, personne ne devrait hasarder d’écrire sur cette matière, qui est
approfondie avec toute l’érudition & la science que l’on peut desirer,” Freminville
began. « Mais si l’on considère que … quatre gros volumes in-folio que contiennent ce
Traité ne se trouvent pas aisément chez tous les Officiers de Police de la campagne…
[et] en y ajoutant ceux qui sont intervenus depuis trente-quatre ans de l’impression de
ce Traité, c’est ce que j’ai tâché de ramasser ; & afin d’en faciliter la lecture, je l’ai mis
11
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“Transgression of laws and ordinances are crimes both large and
small, but however slight they may be, the ministry of the procureur
fiscal must not tolerate them,” Freminville observed. “To despise but
ignore small mistakes is to allow larger ones, and impunity throws
villains into new infidelities.”13 Quoting Saint-Bernard, from Book 3 of
de Consideratione, Freminville declared that impunity is the “daughter
of negligence, mother of insolence, source of impudence, nurse of
iniquity and of transgressions of law.”14 He concluded: “The officer
whose role is to suppress anything that deviates from what is prescribed
as orderly must not neglect, even with respect to minor things, to punish
those who contravene.”15
Oddly, Freminville himself was deeply skeptical of these
ordinances and opposed the restrictions on commerce associated with the
regulation of the grain and bread markets. Freminville was a partisan of
free trade, he professed. “It is indeed a delicate matter to tinker with the
price of grain and its commerce, because he who regulates with an eye to
reducing the market price often discovers that, as a result of unforeseen
circumstances, the very regulations that he crafted, far from reducing it,
raise the price and reduce the supply of the goods in question.”16 To
Freminville, the little-known author of the well-known Essai sur la
Police générale des Grains, sur leurs prix, &c., published anonymously
in London in 1753, was entirely right when he declared that “by far the
wisest and best policy to adopt is to grant merchants who commerce in
grain absolute liberty, and to allow them to transport grain from one
province to another, which is most fortunately what is now currently
allowed under the King’s declaration of September 17, 1754.”17
Freminville was a free trader and believed that self-interest would
serve to ensure an abundant supply of wheat and barley. This, he
par forme de Dictionnaire, & ai rapporté à chaque terme les Ordonnances & Arrêts qui
en font la décision. » (Freminville 1758 :iii).
13
Freminville 1758:vii.
14
Freminville 1758 :vii-viii.
15
Freminville 1758 :viii.
16
Freminville 1758 :267.
17
Freminville 1758 :267 (the author of the anonymous text was Claude-Jacques
Herbert).
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thought, was self-evident and demonstrated practically every day:
whereas, for instance, the grain reserves maintained by the state and
provinces had to be thrown in the river, rotten and infested, private
individuals preserved their stock well in their granaries. “Such waste
would never happen with an individual,” Freminville observed, “because
it is their own property.”18 Private property and personal interest would
help forestall such sordid outcomes and prevent the recurring grain
shortages—les disettes, as they were called—that plagued France.
Many other historians of the Parisian grain and bread markets
would share Freminville’s curious, almost morbid fascination with the
intricate details of the ordinances, royal declarations, and sentences.
Though they too often favored free commerce, they were seduced by the
maze of market regulations—as if they couldn’t not look. The leading
historical treatment from the nineteenth century on the police des
grains—the treatise most often cited in later works—is itself the product
of an arch opponent of market regulation. Georges Afanassiev, the
privat-docent at the University of Odessa in Russia, was a scholar of
Turgot who later turned to the commerce of grain. Afanassiev spent two
years conducting archival research in Paris in the early 1890’s and
produced a thorough and well-documented text, Le Commerce des
céréales en France au dix-huitième siècle, originally printed in Russian,
translated into French, and published in Paris in 1894. Afanassiev
opposed these market regulations, yet studied them in an equally
obsessive manner, captivated by their intricacy and complexity. The
leading contemporary treatment of the police des grains, Steven
Kaplan’s magisterial two-volume book, Bread, Politics and Political
Economy in the Reign of Louis XV, though remarkably balanced and
erudite, also discloses a slight preference for liberalization. “In many of
its particulars,” Kaplan admitted, “the liberal bill of indictment [of the
police des grains] was well founded.”19 Kaplan adds, “The [liberal] grain
reforms were a devastating critique of the police practices we have
discussed.”20
Despite his free trade ideology, then, Freminville dissected and
catalogued, reported, cried—much like the sentences themselves were
18

Freminville 1758 :267.
Kaplan 1976:Vol.2:680.
20
Kaplan 1976:Vol.2:682.
19
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cried at market—and decried the intricate details of myriad rules and
regulations. Of Freminville’s lengthy book, ninety pages concern the
cultivation and commerce of grain, the sale of bread, the regulation of
the boulangers, meuniers, etc. That represents a full sixth of the entire
dictionary. And it covered everything from prohibiting the purchase of
grain on the stalk to prohibiting anyone from walking in fields that have
been sown (especially to pick flowers); from fixing the hours of sale to
fixing the dates for harvesting; from prohibiting speech that would tend
to raise grain prices to requiring seminaries and colleges to warehouse
three years worth of grain at all times.
All sales, naturally, were to take place at market. “It is forbidden,
first, to sell or buy grains outside the market. The age-old prohibitions on
this question, which dated back to the fourteenth century, had never been
repealed, and since 1709 had been taken up again and applied more or
less strictly.”21 Freminville reported that the police of the Châtelet, by
sentence dated February 20, 1728, convicted a man named Lorillard for
having sold “two muids of quality flour . . . outside of the market
square.”22 Another police sentence, dated May 27, 1729, condemned
several merchants—Petit, Chateaudun, and the son, René Petit—for
having sold sixteen muids of wheat elsewhere than at market, and fined
them each a thousand livres.23 There are similar sentences recorded for
February 29, 1731, January 31, 1738, and August 3, 1742 – all for selling
grain or flour off-market.24 In the police sentence dated January 11,
1737, the lieutenant général “renewed the prohibitions applicable to all
bakers, millers, brewers, and the like, against buying any grain or flour,
and to all farmers, farm laborers, and the like, against selling the same,
by specimen or sample, anywhere within eight leagues of Paris.”25
To ensure that all sales were conducted at market, other
regulations imposed an obligation to certify market sales. A sentence
issued in the police tribunal of the old Châtelet, dated October 10, 1681,
confirms the confiscation of a “muid (measure) of flour in fifteen bags”
for not having obtained a “certificate from where such merchandise was
21

Weulersse 1910, vol. I :534.
Freminville 1758: 451.
23
Freminville 1758: 451-52.
24
Freminville 1758 :452.
25
Freminville 1758 :454.
22
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bought,” and for failing to turn over the goods “to the measurers upon
arrival at the doors and barriers” of the city.26 It is interesting to note that
the inspection here had been conducted by “Marie Claude Croisette, the
elder, agent of the guild (Communauté) of the elected syndics of
measurers of grain and flour of the city, fauxbourgs, and banlieus of
Paris.”27 The police were not the only investigators but were assisted by
the syndics of the merchant communities—and often, it was the other
way around too.
Once at the market, producers were forbidden to sell their grain
and flour before a specified hour—an hour that varied according to the
season. The eighteenth-century regulations followed daylight savings
time.28 “The opening of trading day in the markets and ports of Paris was
fixed by a series of ordinances,” Afanassiev tells us. “From Easter to
Saint-Rémy, sales began at eight o’clock in the morning; from SaintRémy to Easter, at nine o’clock. In the provincial markets, market days
and opening hours were determined the same way.”29 There were also
rules about who could buy first at market. “Typically, the opening [of the
market] was reserved for private individuals,” Afanassiev writes, “that is
to say, those who were neither bakers nor traders. Members of this latter
group were not admitted until later. In Paris, they did not have the right
to come to the market or be represented there before noon, nor could
they even talk with vendors near the perimeter of the market.”30
Freminville adds: “It is forbidden for all innkeepers, hoteliers, and
cabaret owners to buy on days of markets and fairs . . . before eight
o’clock in the morning from Easter to the first of October, and before
nine o’clock from the first of October to Easter.”31
Other ordinances punished speech that could tend to increase the
price of grain: “It is not permitted to hold, spread, or publish any speech
that could prevent [the sale of grain] at the fixed price, nor to suggest
26

Sentence de la Chambre de police du Châtelet, qui déclare valable une saisie d’un
muid de farine, à la requête du procureur des jurés mesureurs de grain. 10 octobre
1681. Paris : M. Le Prest (s.d.).
27
Id.
28
See Ph. Rur. Chap. XI, p. 364; Lettre a un ami, pp. 90-93.
29
Afanassiev 1894:71 (relying on Delamare, t. II, p. 81).
30
Afanassiev 1894:71 (relying on Ordonnance de décembre 1672).
31
Freminville 1758:468.
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that the cost of grain will increase, that there isn’t any grain at such and
such place, or that it is worth a lot more elsewhere; speech of this nature
tends to cause the price to increase,” Freminville explained.32 A police
sentence of the Châtelet dated July 22, 1740, fined a man named Fieffé
2,000 livres for having “held in the Gonesse market speech that tended to
alarm the public and to raise the price of grain.”33 What, exactly, was the
nature of his speech? The squire Martin Rulhier, the sheriff of the Île-deFrance and commander of the brigade of Saint Denis, had gone to the
Gonesse market to “investigate any violations that could have been
committed against the spirit of the king’s declarations, the judgments of
parliament, and the regulations and sentences of the police…”34 The
widow Bethemont, baker at Gonesse, told him that a certain Fieffé, a
farmer, had refused to sell her his nine septiers of wheat at the common
market price. “He would only sell the wheat thirty livres, whereas the
highest price that day had been twenty-six livres; she [the widow
Bethemont] had offered twenty-seven, at which he replied that for that
price he would prefer to pack it up, especially since he had gotten thirtythree livres at Pont, twenty-eight at Dammartin, and thirty-two at
Nanteuil-le-Hardouin. He said he would sell it on at the next market, and
in effect packed up his nine septiers of wheat.”35 The police lieutenant
characterized this speech as “tending to alarm the public, cause sedition,
increase the price of grain, and consequently that of bread.”36
According to Freminville, the grain trade had to be one of the
main concerns of the county prosecutor. Freminville repeatedly
underscored the importance of the market regulations: grain and grain
markets, he affirmed, “should constitute the largest and principal
responsibility of the Procurer Fiscal.”37 “We are dealing here with the
lives of our fellow humans, and it is imperative that they not be
sacrificed to the monopolists who meddle in selling and reselling
grain.”38 Freminville’s dictionary covered the grain industry
exhaustively, and there were in fact so many regulations of the market
32

Freminville 1758:213.
Freminville 1758:213.
34
Freminville 1758:213.
35
Freminville 1758:214.
36
Freminville 1758:214.
37
Freminville 1758:166.
38
Freminville 1758:266.
33
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that, for the dictionary entry on “Marchés”—the entry on markets—
Freminville merely refers the reader, by cross reference, to another
entry.39 His dictionary reads:
MARKETS. SEE POLICE.
To our modern eyes, the Parisian police des grains—that intricate
and extensive web of royal decrees and ordinances that governed every
minute aspect of the commerce of grain under the ancient régime and
that gave rise to what has been called “the grain wars of the eighteenth
century”40—has come to symbolize excessive government control and
intervention. The policing of the grain trade—that tangled lattice of
edicts and decrees intended to keep down the price of bread in Paris and
the provinces—stands today as a labyrinth, a maze, a morass of
regulations, of minute government tinkering in the most atomic details of
the commercial exchange.
Codes, dictionaries, and treatises of the police would proliferate
in the mid-eighteenth century to catalogue and disseminate these
ordinances. The 1750s and 60s were an important period—not, naturally,
for the codification of rules themselves. That had been recurring since at
least the sixteenth century and the important dates were well known: the
réglements of 1567 and 1577, the déclaration of August 31, 1699 or
April 19, 1723. No, the mid-eighteenth century was an important period
for the dissemination of the rules, for the cataloguing, for publicizing the
regulations. 1758 marked not only the publication of Freminville’s
Dictionnaire, but also of Duchesne’s Code de la police, ou analyse des
réglemens de police, divisé en douze titres. Originally published in Paris
the year before, Duchesne’s popular treatise would already be reprinted a
year later and it compiled, in over 480 pages, all the police rules and
regulations that extended over the areas of religion, customs, health,
science and liberal arts, commerce, manufacture, mechanical arts,
servants, domestics, and the poor. Within the policing of commerce
alone, Duchesne had chapters on weights and measures, on fairs and
markets, on the commerce in grain, wine, livestock, candles, wood and
39

Freminville 1758:367 (« MARCHÉS. V. POLICE. »).
“La guerre du blé au XVIIIe siècle” is the very title of an excellent collection of
writings on the topic. See Gauthier and Ikni 1988.

40
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wool—to name a few—and on merchants, their agents, currency
exchanges, and banks. 1758 also marked the publication of the first
volumes of the Code Louis XV: Recueil des principaux Edits,
déclarations, Ordonnances, Arrêts, Sentences et réglemens concernant
la justice, police et finances depuis 1722 jusqu'en 1740. The Recueil
would assemble all the important ordinances and sentences on policing
and grow to a twelve volume set, in-12.41 Numerous other codes,
including Deslandes’ 1767 Code de la police ou analyse des réglemens
de police, divisé en douze titres, would be published and reprinted in
Paris during the period.
It was precisely this maze of ordinances that Adam Smith, in The
Wealth of Nations, castigated as “such absurd regulations, as frequently
aggravate the unavoidable misfortune of a dearth, into the dreadful
calamity of a famine”42 or as “the folly of human laws.”43 It was an
economic approach, Smith would famously suggest, that “embraced all
the prejudices of the mercantile system, in its nature and essence a
system of restraint and regulation.”44 And still today, we characterize the
period as excessively regulated, over-regulated, a frenzy of market
intervention—the minute regulation of the smallest infraction. Ordermaintenance at the most micro level.

II.

The contrast could not be greater with our perception of contemporary
markets—whether in grain or more broadly. Today we tend to view
modern markets and commodity exchanges as relatively free. Commerce
has been liberalized, the forces of free market exchange have been
unleashed, and the constraints of the past lifted. Self-adjusting market
mechanisms have replaced the police des grains and, in a far more
efficient manner, ensure reasonable prices and abundant supply. Though
globalization and population growth loom on the horizon as a potential

41

Code Louis XV: 1758-60.
Smith 1976 II:48 [Bk. IV, Ch. V].
43
Smith 1976 II:50.
44
Smith 1976 II:182 [Bk. IV, Ch. IX].
42
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threat to the adequate supply of commodities, voluntary and free market
exchange at home is the model of choice.
“[T]he close of the twentieth century saw a virtual canonization
of market organization as the best, indeed the only effective, way to
structure an economic system,” observes professor Richard Nelson at
Columbia University.45 As J. Rogers Hollingsworth and Robert Boyer
add, “Throughout Eastern and Western Europe as well as in North
America during the 1980s, there was a dramatic shift toward a popular
belief in the efficacy of self-adjusting market mechanisms. Indeed, the
apparent failure of Keynesian economic policies, the strains faced by the
Swedish social democratic model, and the collapse of Eastern bloc
economies led many journalistic observers to argue that capitalism is a
system of free markets that has finally triumphed.”46 Nelson captures the
dominant, orthodox view succinctly:
For-profit firms are the vehicles of production. They
decide what to produce and how, on the basis of their
assessments about what is most profitable…. Competition
among firms assures that production is efficient and
tailored to what users want, and prices are kept in line
with costs. The role of government is limited to
establishing and maintaining a body of law to set the rules
for the market game and assuring the availability of basic
infrastructure needed for the economy to operate.47
Nelson concedes that this is a simplified version of “the standard
textbook model in economics,”48 perhaps even a bit “folk theory.”49 But
it is, in broad outline, an accurate description of a dominant view that has
had a powerful influence on the latter part of the twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries. As Boyer suggests, accurately I believe, “The
market is now considered by a majority of managers and politicians as

45

Nelson 2005a:1. Leading exponents of this view include Francis Fukuyama (1992),
Daniel Yergen and Joseph Stanislaw (1998), and others.
46
Hollingsworth and Boyer 1997a:1.
47
Nelson 2005a:1.
48
Nelson 2005a:1.
49
Nelson 2005a:1.
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the coordinating mechanism ‘par excellence.’”50 The financial crisis of
2008 has shaken these beliefs, but has not displaced them.
This standard view generally traces to the Chicago School of
Economics and its founders, Milton Friedman and George Stigler. For
the educated reader of the New York Times, the tenets of the Chicago
School are usefully summarized by the economics columnist, David
Leonhardt, in the following terms: “The Chicago School believes that
markets—that is, millions of individuals making separate decisions—
almost always function better than economies that are managed by
governments. In a market system, prices adjust whenever there is a
shortage or a glut, and the problem soon resolves itself. Just as
important, companies constantly compete with each other, which helps
bring down prices, improves the quality of goods and ultimately lifts
living standards.”51
To be sure, many commentators today, especially law scholars
and lawyers who toil in the regulatory domain, consider this “free market
libertarian” version of the Chicago School a bit of an extreme position.
Even some of the staunchest Chicago School adherents have themselves
softened their claims to allow for slightly more governmental
intervention in cases of market failure due to collective action,
monopolistic, or other coordination problems. Richard Epstein, for
instance, has softened his libertarian edge with age and embraced a more
welfarist position. “My ideal government is not quite as small as [I
suggested in the 1970s], but it is still much smaller than the massive
government in place today,” Epstein states. “Thus it is not sufficient to
assume that the only forms of conduct accompanied by undesirable
social consequences are those involving the use of force or fraud…. [A]
more comprehensive social statement seeks to maximize social welfare,
embracing the libertarian prohibitions, but going beyond them to allow
certain forms of regulation and taxation to overcome these otherwise
intractable coordination problems.”52 Similarly, Richard Posner has
softened his libertarianism with pragmatism.53
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Nevertheless, the more extreme market libertarian position has
helped shape a more moderate view that is dominant today: the view that
government intervention in the economic domain tends to be inefficient
and should therefore be avoided. What characterizes this more moderate
view is a set of softer a priori assumptions that are reflected, especially,
in the rhetoric of economic debate. In contrast to the more extreme
rhetoric of the Chicago School—for instance, the argument that the free
market is practically always more efficient—market liberals suggest that
government intervention tends to be less efficient; that it is generally the
case that market mechanisms work better, in part because of lower
transaction costs, but also because market participants are better
information gatherers and tend to be more invested in the ultimate
outcome; and that government agencies suffer from greater principalagent problems, are less nimble at adjusting to changing market
conditions, and become more entrenched and subject to interest group
capture. These are familiar arguments and, together, they tend to
promote a loose default position that favors market mechanisms over
“regulation”—a tilt in favor of markets. For simplicity, I will refer to this
set of ideas as “neoliberalism.”54
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, this view helped bring
about a wave of privatization in the United States and abroad, in Great
Britain.55 The momentum has continued since that time and the effects of
54
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privatization have been significant in a wide range of industries, from
airlines and communications to what were often viewed as more
traditional state and local services. The global embrace of privatization
strengthened in the 1990s with the collapse of the former Soviet Union
and of its political and economic influence over Eastern Europe. Today,
the call for privatization is no longer limited to Reaganites and can be
heard across the political spectrum—even among younger Democrats.56
And this view today has infiltrated the public imagination and
shaped public opinion. This is evident in public opinion polls—at least
prior to the 2008 financial crisis. In a Financial Times/Harris Poll
opinion poll conducted September 6 and 17, 2007, 49% of respondents
in the United States answered affirmatively—in contrast to 17% who
responded negatively—to the question “Do you think a free-market,
capitalist economy (an economic system in which prices and wages are
determined by unrestricted competition between businesses, with limited
government regulation or fear of monopolies) is the best economic
system or not?”57 In another poll, a twenty-nation poll conducted by the
Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the University of
Maryland, researchers found that an average 71% of respondents in the
United States agree with the statement that “The free enterprise system
and free market economy is the best system on which to base the future
of the world;” only 24% of respondents disagreed with that statement.58
Until very recently, this dominant view was reinforced daily in
the leading newspapers, in the media, and through the voice of our
56
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national leaders both on the right and on the left—often in the most
unexpected places. “The market is the best mechanism ever invented for
efficiently allocating resources to maximize production,” presidential
candidate Barack Obama tells the New York Times. Obama adds, “I also
think that there is a connection between the freedom of the marketplace
and freedom more generally.”59 Here is an excerpt from another New
York Times Magazine article, this time on the economist and former
Harvard University President, Larry Summers, that also recites the
boilerplate history and the dominant view: “The decades after World
War II were dominated by the Keynesian notion—shaped in part by one
of [Summers’] Nobel-Winning uncles, Paul Samuelson—that
government was good. But the stagflation of the 1970s caused a whole
generation of economists to look instead toward the market, which
seemed far more efficient at allocating resources.” 60 Larry Summers
stands in for this dominant view: “Today Summers says he believes in
markets as much as ever, and he begins almost any discussion of
globalization by pointing out its benefits. Food, clothing, furniture and
dozens of everyday items are more affordable than they once were.
Interest rates are low, as is inflation, and recessions come less often.
Bringing down the deficit in the ‘90s, he argues, helped make this
possible.”61 According to Summers, “I think now the challenge is, again,
to protect a basic market system based on open trade and globalization,
to make it one that works for everyone or almost everyone, at a time
when market forces are often producing outcomes that seem increasingly
problematic to middle-class families.”62
Contemporary self-adjusting market mechanisms have
triumphed, and we are no longer at the mercy of the minute disciplinary
regimentation characterized by the Parisian police des grains of the mideighteenth century. At least, that’s what we like to tell ourselves.

III.
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In the wheat pits at the Chicago Board of Trade, 12:01 P.M., March 20,
1996, following a period of tight supplies in the wheat market. Loud
buzzers and Board staff visually signaled the close of the market for the
March 1996 wheat futures. The closing period—which spanned from
12:00 P.M. to 12:01 P.M. on March 20th—had just expired. There were
sixty-one buy order contracts that were still unfilled at the end of the
closing period, and the last contracts had traded at $5.30 to $5.35 a
bushel, in line with the morning’s trades. Two traders who held marketon-close orders, George F. Frey and John C. Bedore, bid up the price
through closing to approximately $6.00 per bushel, but they were met
with no responses from other members of the pit.
At 12:02 P.M., one minute past the close, J. Brian Schaer, a local
in the pit, offered to sell contracts at $7.00, and approximately twelve
seconds later, at 12:02:12 P.M., sold thirty-one contracts at that price to
Frey and Bedore—who had been bidding up the price hoping to close
their open orders. Donald W. Scheck, another local, then offered
contracts at $7.50, with Brian Schaer matching that offer. In the next half
a minute, Scheck sold fourteen contracts to a broker Jay P. Ieronimo and
Schaer sold another sixteen contracts to Frey and Ieronimo, with the final
trades taking place at 12:02:50 P.M.—one minute and fifty seconds past
closing.
Rule 1007.00 of the Chicago Board of Trade provides that the pit
committee—in this case, the “Wheat Pit Committee” chaired by Jay
Ieronimo, who had just traded post-closing—could authorize an
extension of one minute only of the closing period in the case of an
extraordinary expiration. That never happened,63 but even if it had, it
would only have extended the trading period to 12:02 P.M., which would
not have covered the trades contracted after that. A number of Board
officials, including Chicago Board of Trade chairman, Patrick Arbor, and
the Exchange Pit Reporter Floor Supervisor, Patrick Sgaraglino, gathered
to discuss whether any trades after 12:02 P.M. should be honored and
cleared through the house. They decided the trades would stand because
of “special circumstances” surrounding the March wheat futures.
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Ieronimo, in his capacity as chair of the Wheat Pit Committee,
then began asking around to find out if any of the traders were interested
in holding a modified closing call—known in the trade as an “MCC” and
consisting of “a two-minute post-close trading session which may occur
after the end of a trading session and allows market users to close out
unliquidated positions. Pit committees schedule MCC sessions only
when there is an expression of interest. The MCC settlement price,
which serves as the basis for the trading range during the MCC session,
is selected by the pit committee.”64 Brian Schaer, who had sold contracts
past 12:02 P.M., was apparently the only trader who expressed interest in
an MCC.
Ieronimo decided to hold the MCC. “A bull horn was used to
announce that an MCC would be held from 12:14 P.M. to 12:16 P.M. A
few seconds before the start of the MCC, an Exchange official
announced that the MCC price range would be $5.30 to $5.32 per
bushel.”65 Ray Czupek, the floor manager and broker for Louis Dreyfus
Corporation—which still held a significant long position in March
wheat—offered contracts at $5.32 per bushel—thus entering the market
for new business in violation of the Board rule against entering new
orders during an MCC. Brian Shaer and Donald Scheck, who had both
sold contracts ranging between $7.00 and $7.50 after the one-minute
extension to closing, were the only ones to bite. Schaer and Scheck both
bought contracts sufficient to offset the entire positions that they had just
created post-closing, and made profits on their trades of, respectively,
$434,800 and $152,600. There were no other trades made during the
MCC. Others involved in the earlier trading saw large losses, some as
high as $300,000.
The Office of Investigations and Audits of the Chicago Board of
Trade conducted a quick review of the March futures expiration, and
about a month later the Business Conduct Committee of the Board issued
charges against Schaer, Scheck, Ieronimo, Frey, Bedore, and Czupek, as
well as Dreyfus and two other firms. They were charged with violations
of Chicago Board Rules 1007.00, 350.05(h), 1007.02, and 425.02,
proscribing after-hours trading, MCC conventions, and hedging rules.
64
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Board Rules 1007.00 and 1007.02, for instance, set forth the following
restrictions on trading:
On the last day of trading in an expiring future, a bell shall
be rung at 12 o’clock noon designating the beginning of the
close of the expiring future. Trading shall be permitted
thereafter for a period not to exceed one minute and
quotations made during this time period shall constitute the
close. When in the opinion of the relevant Pit Committee
extraordinary conditions prevail any such one minute period
may be extended to two minutes by special authorization of
the relevant Pit Committee…
Immediately following the prescribed closing procedure for
all contracts, there shall be a two (2) minute trading period
(the “modified closing call”). All trades which may occur
during regularly prescribed trading hours may occur during
the call at prices within the lesser of the actual closing range
or a range of three (3) official trading increments, i.e., one
(1) increment above and below the settlement price, or at
prices within the lesser of the actual closing range or a range
of nine (9) official trading increments, i.e., four (4)
increments above and below the settlement price, as the
Regulatory Compliance Committee shall prescribe; (ii) no
new orders may be entered into the call; (iii) cancellations
may be entered into the call; (iv) stop, limit and other resting
orders elected by prices during the close may be executed
during the call; and (v) individual members may trade as a
principal and/or agent during the call. In accordance with the
determination of the Regulatory Compliance Committee,
CBOT contracts shall be traded during the Modified Closing
Call as follows: Lesser of actual closing range or nine
trading increments [for] Wheat Futures and Options.66

During the summer of 1996, the Board entered into settlement
negotiations with Schaer, Scheck, and the other individuals and firms,
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and resolved the charges by way primarily of written reprimand.
Settlements were reached with Schaer, Scheck, Ieronimo, Frey and
Bedore by issuing letters of reprimand against each of them, and with
Dreyfus Corporation by means of an admission of wrongdoing and a
$10,000 fine.
The Divisions of Enforcement and Trading & Markets of the
Commodity Futures Trading Commission, however, recommended that
the Commission review the six settlements because they did not believe
that the written sanctions were “commensurate with the gravity of the
alleged violation and otherwise failed to conform to Commission
guidance on sanctions.”67 In light of the Commission’s decision to
review, the Chicago Board of Trade conducted additional investigations
and interviewed 38 persons, had the interviews transcribed and then
reviewed by the staff of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
which oversees the Board; the Board prepared follow-up questions for 19
persons at the request of the Commission staff, and resubmitted the
second round of interviews to the Commission. The Board also
submitted documentary evidence of trading cards, order tickets, and
other reports.
The Commission conducted additional investigation of its own,
reviewing—in addition to the Board documents, the record of the
disciplinary proceedings, and written argument by the parties—
“observations of Commission floor surveillance staff during the
expiration” and “information independently obtained by the Commission
staff.”68 The latter included “interviews with commercial participants,
market analyses, trading profiles of the two locals [Shaer and Scheck]
involved in the expiration, a trade practice investigation, review of data
to determine compliance with speculative position limits, and a review of
the ‘gap’ function in the CBOT’s price reporting system.”69
The Commission set aside the sanctions and remanded the cases
back to the Board of Trade because the penalties had not been severe
enough. “In order to protect the integrity of the markets, the exchanges
must vigorously enforce their rules concerning trading hours and impose
67
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meaningful sanctions in disciplinary proceedings alleging trading after
the close,” three Commissioners declared. “We believe that imposing
reprimands for misconduct as serious as that alleged here, even in the
context of settled proceedings, reflects an apparent unwillingness on the
part of the CBOT to enforce its rules in the manner necessary to ensure
an effective self-regulatory disciplinary program.”70
The notion of “self-regulation” is critical in the commission’s
written opinion. The very term “self-regulatory” is used seven times in
the main text, another five times in the margin and twice in the
dissenting opinion: strict sanctions are “necessary to ensure an effective
self-regulatory disciplinary program,”71 reflect the Board’s “critical selfregulatory responsibilities,”72 and whether the Board “adequately
fulfilled its self-regulatory responsibilities,”73 indicate “the seriousness
with which the self-regulatory organization views its rules,”74 and are
crucial for such “self-regulatory organizations.”75 In this case, the
Commission concludes, “the sanctions chosen by the CBOT are
inadequate in light of … their reflection of an apparent failure in the self“In
exercising
their
self-regulatory
regulatory
system.”76
responsibilities,” the Commission emphasizes, “exchanges should take
vigorous action against those who engage in activities which violate their
rules…”77 In conclusion, the Commission notes, “The CBOT’s approach
in these cases could seriously undermine its ability to operate effectively
as a self-regulatory organization.”78
The Commission justifies their concern with the following:
[A]ny disregard of established trading hours should be viewed as
a significant violation. Rules governing the time, place, and
manner of trading help to ensure a fair and open market. No one
of these requirements is less important than the others, and
70
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noncompliance with any one of them may be as damaging to the
market as noncompliance with all of them. Even when done in
the pit by “open outcry,” post-close trading threatens an open and
competitive market because a large segment of the market—those
who obey the rules governing trading hours—are excluded from
participating. As former Commission Chairman Philip Johnson
has observed, the rationale for prohibiting trading other than
during official trading hours is that “true competition is only
present in the marketplace during normal hours of trading.” The
absence of “true competition” calls into question the price
discovery role of the exchange and could result in loss of
confidence in CBOT prices. As we recently stated, “open and
competitive execution is the bedrock underlying public
confidence in the objectivity and fairness of futures trading.”79
Trading-hour infractions are extremely significant, the Commission
emphasized. In fact, “Congress has determined that activities like [these]
are malum in se, and it is our duty to assure that this legislative
determination is effectuated.”80
The United States Attorney’s Office in Chicago began
investigating trading-hour infractions on the Chicago Board of Trade. In
order to preempt further federal intervention, the Board revised its rules
regarding the possible extension of the closing period. “Most notably, the
CBOT deleted the provision under which the close of an expiring
contract could be extended from one minute to two minutes, thus
eliminating potential confusion among floor members about the
appropriate duration for a close in an expiring contract. The CBOT also
now precludes the pit reporters from accepting price quotations more
than 30 seconds after the close for futures in order to assure that trading
is halted on time.”81

IV.
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More than two centuries separate the police des grains and these
enforcement proceedings at the Chicago Board of Trade. The two
periods bear important similarities and differences. Yet our perception of
the two could not be more radically divergent. The Paris markets of the
mid-eighteenth century represent to us today the epitome of excess
regulation—of government intervention gone awry, of authoritarian
control of the economy. In contrast, the Chicago Board of Trade reflects,
to our modern eyes, the epitome of the free market in the western world,
the pinnacle of free trade, the zenith of late-modern capitalism. Simply
put, the Chicago Board of Trade is the free market. When we look at the
Chicago Board or the New York Stock Exchange, we do not see the
intricate web of regulations regarding closing periods and trading hours,
access, surveillance, and computer monitoring. We do not see Chicago
Board Rules 1007.00, 350.05(h), 1007.02, and 425.02, proscribing afterhours trading, MCC conventions, and hedging rules. We see the free
market at work. How did that come about?
At both times, the market was the exclusive venue in which to
exchange the desired commodities and the markets were highly
administered. Who, when, where, how—the hours of opening and
closing, the identity of the merchants, traders, and buyers, the means of
delivery, controls on variations in pricing—all aspects of trading on the
markets were regulated. Our contemporary markets—whether the
Chicago Board of Trade, the New York Mercantile Exchange, the New
York Stock Exchange, or any of the other exchanges—are shot through
with layers of overlapping governmental supervision, of exchange rules
and regulations, of federal and state criminal investigations, and of
exchange self-policing and self-regulatory mechanisms—as evident in
the case of Schaer and Scheck. Our contemporary markets, like the
Parisian markets of the eighteenth century, are policed.
Naturally, there are also marked differences. No police prefect or
procureur fiscal sets the right price of a loaf of bread or a stack of wheat
today—the prix commun du marché—although the commission for
trading the goods may be fixed and, of course, the most important
commodity of all—money—is set by the central bank both in the United
States and in the European Union. No huissard patrols the exchange
floor conducting inspections and ferreting out fraud or deception today—
although computer algorithms, federal investigators, and the exchanges
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themselves monitor each and every trade to detect suspicious activity,
often on “a customer-by-customer basis.”82 Contemporary enforcement
proceedings are more likely to involve self-regulatory mechanisms—
self-monitoring by the exchange itself, a chartered corporation not
formally part of the state—though the earlier markets were also heavily
self-policed under a guild system that functioned by means of elected
syndics who policed and monitored the commercial activities of guild
members.
There are indeed important similarities and significant
differences. As a practical matter, it would be extraordinarily difficult, if
not infeasible to determine with exactitude whether the differences—
with all their related technological transformations and
metamorphoses—outweigh the similarities. It is impossible to quantify
the uniform and gaze of the huissard and measure it against the
electronic impulse that reads every single stock trade on a high volume
alert. It is impracticable to weigh the impact of prohibiting la vente par
échantillons—the sale by samples—against the effect of shutting down a
thriving secondary market in mutual fund shares. “Royal ordinances first
specified a ‘circle of prohibition’ around Paris having a radius of eight
lieues (leagues). Inside this circle, any purchase of grain by bakers or
traders, whether at market or in the growers’ storehouse, was
forbidden”83: how do we measure the effect of this ordonnance and
weigh it against the fixed delivery locations and the limited space for
warehousing wheat in Chicago? How do we weigh the requirement that
all grain be sold at the Paris markets against the contemporary
requirement that all grain futures be traded at the Chicago Board of
Trade?
These questions have no answer, and yet we continue to perceive
the two periods as radically different. How did it come about, exactly,
that we would perceive the first economic regime—the Paris markets
circa 1750—as governed by, to borrow Adam Smith’s words, “such
absurd regulations” and yet view the second regime, the Chicago Board
of Trade of today, as “free”? What has shaped our perception so, that we
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would label one “regulated” and the other “free”? How did that come
about? And at what price?

V.

First,

how did we come to see the Parisian police des grains as the
epitome of disciplinary regulation and the Chicago Board of Trade as the
bastion of freedom? The answer, I believe, turns on the emergence in the
eighteenth century of the idea of natural order—the notion of an
economic system that is autonomous and achieves equilibrium without
government intervention—and the eventual metamorphosis of this idea,
over the course of the twentieth century, into the concept of market
efficiency. It is the idea of natural order that renders coherent and makes
possible the belief in self-adjusting and self-sustaining markets. The idea
of self-stabilizing internal flows that function best when left alone—this
conceptualization of natural orderliness, of spontaneous equilibrium, of
natural harmony in the economic realm, is what allowed eighteenth
century thinkers to reimagine social reality, and it is what facilitates the
understanding we have today. The idea of natural order also made
possible the shift in semiotic meaning of the police des grains—from a
policy viewed as necessary and freedom-enhancing to a policy viewed as
oppressive and misguided. In addition, it also helped displace an earlier
belief that all men naturally tend toward criminal deviance, one that
remains strong today only in the penal domain.

The emergence and triumph of the idea of natural order was
influenced greatly by François Quesnay, the Marquis de Mirabeau,
Dupont de Nemours, Le Mercier de la Rivière and other early French
economists during the period 1756 to 1767. François Quesnay, a highly
accomplished physician at Versailles, the first doctor to Mme. De
Pompadour and first ordinary to Louis XV, and a prolific writer in the
medical field, turned his attention to economics in 1756 and founded an
intellectual circle that became known as “les économistes” or “les
Physiocrates.” Quesnay and his disciples promoted the idea of an “ordre
naturel” in the field of political economy. Their writings were highly
influential both in France and abroad, and it is precisely their notion of
natural order that metamorphosed, over time, into the modern economic
notion of market efficiency that is at the heart of neoliberal thought. The
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Physiocrats’ idea of an “ordre naturel” helped make it possible for us
today to believe that the Parisian markets were overregulated and that
our contemporary markets are free. It is this notion that has shaped the
way we see the world.
Of Public Economy and Police
But it was not always so. Although today we tend to characterize
the regulation of Parisien markets as excessively disciplinary and
repressive, there was an earlier time when these same regulations formed
part of a more coherent understanding that fell under an earlier rubric of
“police” and that formed an integral part of the field of public economy.
One central task of public economy, in the eyes of its earliest exponents,
was precisely to ensure the abundance and cheapness of food and
consumable goods at market—what was called, at the time, providing for
“bon marché.”
The younger Adam Smith understood this well and in fact used
the discourse of bon marché in his lectures on moral philosophy and
jurisprudence in the early 1760s. It was precisely under the rubric of
“police” that Smith lectured on public economy, on the regulation of
markets, on monopolies, money, and trade: on how best to regulate
agricultural production and manufacturing; on how to encourage the
division of labor; on what to do with foreign trade; on how to manage
currency, banking and interest rates—in sum, on how to render the state
more opulent, on how to increase the wealth of a nation, or, which was
the same thing for Smith, on how to enable citizens to obtain needed and
desired food, clothes, and lodging—to satisfy the necessities of life.84
Smith placed his entire discussion of public economy under the rubric of
“police” and he identified the principal task of “police” as facilitating
bon marché.
In his Lectures on Jurisprudence, which he delivered at Glasgow
University during the period 1762 to 1764—after the publication of The
Theory of Moral Sentiments in 1759 but before the Wealth of Nations in
1776—the young Adam Smith used—and used exclusively—the rubric
84
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of “police” to discuss public economy. Once the internal security of a
nation was ensured and subjects could benefit from their private
property, Smith reportedly lectured in 1762-63, the state’s attention
should turn to the task of promoting the state’s wealth. “This produces
what we call police,” Smith said. “Whatever regulations are made with
respect to the trade, commerce, agriculture, manufactures of the country
are considered as belonging to the police.”85
The young Smith traced the notion of police to French
administration, citing the folklore that the king of France demanded three
services from his lieutenant général de police—namely, that he assure
the cleanliness and security of the nation and the abundance and
cheapness of goods at market. Smith referred specifically to the famous
lieutenant de police, Marc René de Voyer de Paulmy, marquis
d’Argenson, chief of police in Paris from 1697 to 1718, and to the story
that, upon acceding to the post, d’Argenson was told that the king of
France expected him to take care of three things: “1st, the clean<n>ess or
neteté; 2nd, the aisance, ease or security; and 3rd, bon marché or
cheapness of provisions.”86 Smith lectured that the goal of police is “the
means proper to produce opulence,”87 and that “the objects of Police are
the cheapness of commodities, public security, and cleanliness.” 88 Under
the heading of police, Smith stated in his 1763-64 lectures, “we will
consider the opulence of a state,”89 or, more specifically, “the
consideration of cheapness or plenty, or, which is the same thing, the
most proper way of procuring wealth and abundance.”90
To the early public economists, including the young Smith,
“police” was what ensured the abundant provision of necessary foods
and commodities. As Michel Foucault, Pasquale Pasquino, and others
85
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have shown, this early notion of “police” conveyed a number of
meanings—not just the enforcement function associated with the
lieutenant général de la police that, at least in some respects, resembles
more closely our contemporary understanding of law enforcement, blue
uniforms, and order maintenance.91 The term “police” also captured, in
broader terms, what we could call today “administration,” but
administration limited to the subdivisions of the state; the term
gouvernement or governing, in contrast, covered the administration of
l’Etat or the state.92 But the different meanings were imbricated: the
administration of subsistence and markets fell under the jurisdiction of
policing functions and were perceived as calling for surveillance. As the
early Smith lectures demonstrate, public economy and “police” were
continuous.
Among the champions of the police des grains—for instance,
commissioner Nicolas Delamare,93 author of the Traité de la police—the
policing of markets reduced the price of bread and ensured bon marché.
Delamare had seen famine and food shortages close up, he explained. A
hands-off approach was the ideal, he suggested, but some oversight and
administration was necessary especially in times of scarcity. True liberty
required government organization. In order to achieve cheapness and
plenty—the central goal of public economy—it was necessary to
calibrate the market. On this earlier view, policing and economic welfare
were one.
It would take but a small step to extend this logic directly to the
field of crime and punishment. The young Milanese aristocrat, Cesare
Beccaria, would do just this in his concise yet seminal tract, Dei delitti e
delle pene (On Crimes and Punishments)—published anonymously in
1764. The new field of public economy, Beccaria boasted, had tamed
and civilized nations through commerce. “We have discovered the true
relations between sovereign and subjects,” Beccaria declared, “and there
is waged among nations a silent war by trade, which is the most humane
91
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sort of war and more worthy of reasonable men.”94 The same lessons,
Beccaria believed, could tame and civilize our punishment practices,
and, in the process, eliminate the brutal excesses of seventeenth century
penality. Under Beccaria’s influence, the field of public economy would
colonize the penal domain and impose the same logic of measured and
proportional responses to the same problem of man’s natural tendency
toward deviance. In Beccaria’s eyes, men behave the same way in
economic and in social exchange: they privilege their own self-interest
and always tend to break the rules. In the penal sphere—just as in the
economic domain—the solution Beccaria proposed was to properly
administer a rational framework of tariffs and prices. For Beccaria,
“police” was an integral part of public economy. As a result, Beccaria’s
lectures in public economy delivered in Milan in 1769—the notes of
which were published posthumously as his Elementi or Elements of
Public Economy—covered five areas: agriculture, arts and
manufacturing, commerce, finance, and police. “Of Police” constituted
an integral part of the study of public economy—an entire section
alongside commerce and finance—because it shared the same rationality,
namely that of public administration.
The common thread in the young Adam Smith and in Beccaria is
the continuity between “police” administration and economics. For both,
the two spheres were completely overlapping. To Smith, the umbrella
category is “police,” and that category subsumes the discussion of public
economy and the wealth of a nation. To Beccaria—and other cameralists
of his time—the overarching category is public economy, within which
“police” forms one important sector alongside commerce and finance. In
both, though, the two domains are seamless and continuous. The two
fields overlap and overlay. There is no alterity between them.
Of Physiocrats, Natural Order, and Market Efficiency
It is precisely this vision of a seamless relation between the field
of public economy and the realm of “police” that gives way in the
second half of the eighteenth century to a far different ideal. If cheapness
and plenty, if bon marché was the goal of public economy and of the
police des grains at mid-century, things could hardly have been more
94
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different only a decade later. The contrast is striking and captured by the
new dogma of François Quesnay:
Abondance et non-valeur n’est pas richesse.
Disette et cherté est misère.
Abondance et cherté est opulence.95
In other words, abundance and plenty do not translate into the wealth of
a nation. Scarcity and high prices, of course, are misery. It is abundance
and high prices that produces opulence.
This shift would radically transform the meaning, the
connotation, and the role of policing—and it would do so first in the
writings of the earliest économistes. From François Quesnay’s first
published contribution to the field of political economy, his encyclopedia
entry on Fermiers (Farmers) in Tome VI of the Encyclopédie in 1756, to
his final contributions to economics collected and published in Du Pont
de Nemours’ Physiocratie in 1768, Quesnay would fundamentally
reorient the relationship between public economy and “police”:
governmental intervention in the markets would become oppressive and
interfere with the autonomous functioning of an economic system
governed by natural laws and natural order. By 1776, the year The
Wealth of Nations was published, Adam Smith would no longer use the
rubric “police” to discuss public economy. In fact, the word “police”
only appear once in the entire text of The Wealth of Nations.
A new way of thinking had taken hold, one based on the idea of
natural order. Natural order reigned in the economic domain—in
agriculture and commerce—and thereby obviated the need for “police.”
The sphere of public economy came to be viewed as an autonomous,
self-adjusting system regulated by natural laws that, if left alone,
produced a net product.96 The only way for the state to participate in the
95
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wealth of the nation was not to administer and police, but instead to pull
out of the sphere of agricultural production and stop intervening in
commerce and trade. The police function was severed from the economic
domain and relegated to the margin.
François Quesnay presented the idea of natural order to his
contemporaries in his Tableau économique, first published in an
augmented volume of the Marquis de Mirabeau’s L’Ami des hommes in
1760. The Tableau was a graphic depiction of cash and commodity flows
between the three principle classes of society—the cultivators, the
property-owners, and the manufacturers. By means of a simple graph and
its zig-zag lines, Quesnay sought to visualize his main theses, namely
that agricultural production is the sole source of all societal wealth, that
wealth can only be produced by means of an autonomous system of
exchange, and therefore that the state must cease intervening with tariffs,
restrictions on the flow of trade, and other regulations. Quesnay’s
Tableau économique received a lot of attention because it attempted to
graphically and systematically represent an economic system—what
Louis Dumont refers to as “an ordered whole.”97 This is precisely what
Marx found so brilliant. Marx wrote of Quesnay’s Tableau, in his
Theories of Surplus Value, that “this attempt to represent the whole in
one table that is composed in fact of only five lines, connecting six
points of departure to their endpoints, in the second half of the eighteenth
century, at the infancy of public economy, was a stroke of genius,
without a doubt the most brilliant in the history of public economy.”98
But what was even more important and influential on future liberal
thought was not simply the notion of an economic system, it was rather
the idea of natural order. Systems can function well with external
derive from his economic idea of increasing the “net product”: “The strategic variable,
then, is the magnitude of the net product, and it is to the problem of increasing the net
product that the government’s policy should be primarily directed. Since the magnitude
of the net product depends largely upon the aggregate output of corn and upon the price
of corn, it follows that the government must take all possible measures to increase the
first while at the same time increasing or at least maintaining the second. The
encouragement of investment in agriculture and the stimulation of demand for
agricultural produce must therefore be the main aims of government policy. Most of the
specific policy measures advocated by the Physiocrats will be found upon investigation
to fit into this simple pattern.” (Meek 1962:22).
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calibration and intervention: an engine may function as a perfect whole
so long as one adds fuel. What was remarkable about Quesnay’s Tableau
is that his system was governed by natural order and was entirely
autonomous of external inputs. What Quesnay really contributed was not
just the idea of a system, but that of natural orderliness—an idea that
would eventually receive its most elaborate articulation in Le Mercier de
la Rivière’s 1767 book, L’Ordre naturel et essentiel des sociétés
politiques.
To be sure, the idea of natural order was not entirely new. The
Physiocrats were not the first to draw on or elaborate the concept.
Simone Meyssonnier, in her history of the origins of French liberal
thought in the XVIIIth century, La Balance et l’Horloge (1989), traces
the idea back to Pierre Le Pesant de Boisguilbert who wrote almost a
hundred years earlier in the period 1695 to 1707. Joseph Schumpeter
famously traced the notion back to the Scholastics—the theologians of
the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.99 Schumpeter places Quesnay
firmly among the “philosophers of natural law” influenced by Aquinas
and the medieval natural order theorists.100 And Du Pont de Nemours
himself—the chief publicist and greatest admirer and disciple of
Quesnay—traced the Physiocratic doctrine to, among others, the Marquis
d’Argenson, who is credited with the maxim “Pas trop gouverner.”101
But true originality is not the sole source of influence. Quesnay’s
obsession with natural order was perceived as new—which is often what
matters more. As new and radical. Many believed that it inaugurated, in
the words of Dupont de Nemours, “a new science in Europe,”102 and
many championed Quesnay as the founding father of that new science.
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As Emma Rothschild suggests, “In an epoch of almost obsessive
preoccupation with newness—new sciences, new systems of trade, new
music, objects wholly new in the world—the revolution in economic
thought was genuinely innovative. Quesnay and his followers conceived
of national economies, for the first time, as vast systems of
interdependent flows; Turgot described them as constituted by the
interconnected transactions of millions of individual agents. All
individuals, the poor as well as the rich, the agricultural labourers as well
as the great merchants, were identified as part of a single economic
system.”103
The birth or, perhaps to be fair, the emergence and maturation of
the idea of natural order helped shape a vision of the economic sphere as
an autonomous, self-adjusting, and self-regulated system that could
achieve a natural equilibrium spontaneously and produce increased
wealth. No doubt, material shifts in technology, in agricultural and
industrial production, and larger changes in demographics and
international relations, played important roles in the perceptual change.
But what made the notion of a “free market” comprehensible, coherent,
and convincing was precisely the idea of natural order. It is an idea that
fundamentally altered the discourse and the dominant way of reasoning
and rationalizing the world. It radically altered the way that
contemporaries understood their social surroundings and the relationship
between public economy and “police.”
The same notion resurfaces in the work of Adam Smith and
Jeremy Bentham, and, today, in the work of contemporary neoliberal
thinkers, such as Richard Posner or Richard Epstein. The idea of natural
order has metamorphosed today into the belief in the efficiency of the
market. It is natural order that makes possible Richard Posner’s belief
that “When transaction costs are low, the market is, virtually by
definition, the most efficient method of allocating resources.”104 In fact,
natural efficiency is so central to Richard Posner’s thought that he
defines criminal behavior in terms of efficiency: criminal behavior is
human behavior that is inefficient. As Posner explains, “I argue that what
is forbidden is a class of inefficient acts.”105 The very definition of crime
103
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turns on the notion of natural efficiency. In the very same way, the
Physiocrats would define criminality as disorder and deviance from
natural laws—as we will see shortly.
Today’s neoliberal thought traces back to this severing of
“police” and public economy. This discourse and way of reasoning has
colonized our perception both of the Parisian markets of the eighteenth
century and of our existing markets and exchanges. It is what allows us
to believe, despite the mounting evidence to the contrary—despite the
bailouts of Bear Stearns or Fannie Mae or A.I.G.—that our current
market mechanisms are in fact self-adjusting and self-regulating, and
achieve stability without administration.

VI.

The next question is, then, at what price? At what price have we come
to believe that the economy is the realm of natural order and that the
legitimate sphere of policing—of administration and government—lies
elsewhere? At the price, first, of significantly distorting and expanding
without limit the penal sphere, and, second, of naturalizing and hiding
the regulatory mechanisms in our contemporary markets, and thereby
masking the enormous wealth redistributions that occur daily.
First, the distortion of the penal sphere. The birth of natural order
in the writings of the Physiocrats led seamlessly to the expansion of the
penal sphere as the only legitimate space for governmental
administration and intervention. The idea of orderliness matured into a
political theory that combined laissez faire in commercial matters with
centralized, authoritarian policing elsewhere—what the Physiocrats
referred to as the doctrine of “legal despotism.” Under the rubric “legal
despotism,” François Quesnay and Mercier de la Rivière formulated a
political ideal of complete governmental inactivity in all but the penal
sphere. Given the existence of natural laws governing commerce, the
économistes envisaged no role for the legislature except to criminalize
and punish severely those who deviate from the natural order.
Natural order in the universe implied legal despotism in human
affairs. The Physiocrats embraced this doctrine in 1767 with the
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publication that same year of both Quesnay’s essay, Despotisme de la
Chine and Le Mercier’s book, L’Ordre essentiel et naturel. Their
economic writings led them, in a syllogistic manner, to the conclusion
that natural order in an autonomous economic sphere demands both that
there be no human intervention (in terms of positive law) in the
economic realm and that positive law limit itself to punishing deviance
from the natural order, in other words theft and violence. The logic
proceeded as follows:
1. The economic, agricultural, and commercial realm is
governed by fundamental natural laws that best promote the
interests of mankind.
2. As a result, positive human-made laws could do no more than
merely instantiate the fundamental natural laws. At best,
positive law would simply mirror the natural order; any
deviation would produce disorder rather than order.
3. Therefore, positive law should not extend to the domain of
natural laws, or, as Quesnay stated, “Positive legislation
should therefore not reach the domain of physical laws.”106
4. For this reason there is no need for a separate legislature. All
law-making power should be centralized in a unified
executive—a legal despot—who learns and implements the
laws of nature.
5. It is only those men whose passions are out-of-adjustment
with natural order—those whose passions are “déréglées,”107
as Quesnay wrote—who fail to see and appreciate the
fundamental laws of natural.
6. The only object of positive man-made laws, then, should be
to severely punish those whose passions are out-of-order, as a
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way to protect society from these thieves and derelicts—“des
voleurs et des méchans,” as Quesnay would say.108
The notion of natural order does all the work in this logical
argument, and it leads inexorably to a penal sphere that is, on the one
hand, marginalized, but on the other hand unleashed and allowed to
expand without any limitation. Since some men’s passions are out-oforder and these men cannot appreciate the natural order, the legal despot
has full and unlimited discretion to repress and punish. Man-made,
positive law serves only one legitimate function: to punish those who
violate the natural order.
Notice that the penal sphere, on this view, is portrayed as
exceptional. It is the only domain where natural order does not
autonomously produce the best result for mankind. It is the only place
where order does not reign. It is entirely other, in this sense. It is the
space outside the dominant realm of natural orderliness, the extremity
where one finds, in Quesnay’s words, the passions déréglées and the
hommes pervers.109 The contrast with Beccaria and other cameralists
could not be more pronounced: their seamless web of public economy
and “police” gives way to a sharp distinction between a realm of
economic order, where laissez faire must govern, and a realm for
positive laws and penal sanctions, where the government must and may
only legitimately intervene. The Physiocrats invent natural order in the
economic domain but in the process, establish the penal sphere as the
outer limit of the system, as the only legitimate realm for administration
and repression, as the zone of policing.
Notice also that this view segments an earlier, more unified
conception of man’s natural tendency to deviate from the rules of
society. In Beccaria’s writings, there was a conception of the selfinterested individual who tended to deviate and commit crimes in all
aspects of life, especially in commerce. Beccaria sought to formalize the
relationship of deviance by discovering mathematical relations between
gain and self-interest. His underlying assumption, though, was that all
merchants will deviate—and their self-interested deviations do not
108
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necessarily serve the public good. This was also not a story of private
vices, public virtues. In contrast, here, only those who are déréglés have
a natural tendency toward unproductive deviance. The pursuit of selfinterest is no longer viewed as a criminal tendency.
This new penal paradigm significantly influenced nineteenth
century liberal and modern neoliberal thought. Although Adam Smith
and Jeremy Bentham would reject Physiocratic thought—primarily
because of Quesnay’s devotion to agriculture as the sole means of
creating national wealth—both Smith and Bentham embraced and
developed a notion of natural order in their economic writings and
reproduced—by the odd conjunction of liberal economic theory and
Beccarian punishment theory—the same relationship between markets
and punishment: natural order in the economic sphere but government
intervention in the penal sphere.
This is most evident in Jeremy Bentham’s work. On the public
economy side, Bentham embraced Adam Smith’s liberalism. In his
Manual of Political Economy written in 1793-95, Bentham rehearses the
liberal doctrines of self-interest and social welfare—of private vices and
public virtues: self-interest in the economic context, rather than leading
to disorder and crime, promotes the greatest economic advantage for all.
Because human wisdom is tied to self-interest, governmental
interference, Bentham suggested, could only result in less wealth being
created.110 And to help explain this, Bentham appeals to nature: “Nature
gives a premium for the application of industry to the most advantageous
branch, a premium which is sure to be disposed of to the best
advantage.”111 Bentham completes the argument suggesting that, not
only will giving individuals the greatest freedom to pursue their own
self-interest result in the greatest advantage for themselves, but it will
also produce the greatest happiness and advantage for society as a
whole.112 In his public economy, Bentham favored Smith’s liberalism.
On the punishment side, however, Bentham embraced Beccaria
whole cloth. In all matters penal, Bentham aligned himself with
Beccaria’s notion of policing and administration—of a sphere of human
110
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activity that must be shot through with government intervention. In fact,
the criminal code, for Bentham, was precisely a “grand catalogue of
prices” by means of which the government set the price of deviance. The
penal code was a menu of fixed prices, the exact opposite of laissez
faire.
Beccaria’s influence on Bentham was formative. Beccaria’s small
tract, On Crimes and Punishments, had been translated into English in
1767—at which point Bentham would have been 19 years old. Bentham
wrote the main manuscript of his first work on the same topic, Rationale
for Punishment, in 1775 when he was, in H.L.A. Hart’s words, “fresh
from the study of Beccaria’s already famous book.”113 Bentham agreed
with Beccaria on all major aspects of his theory of punishment: they both
viewed deviance and rule-breaking in this domain as natural and
universal—as the basic condition of man; they both critiqued the
brutalizing effect of excessive punishment and endorsed marginal
deterrence as a limiting principle on punishment; they both favored
speedy and certain punishments as a way to reinforce the associations of
punishment with crime; and more generally they both agreed on the need
for formal law and “legality” as giving legitimacy to the criminal justice
system and the sovereign.
Naturally, Bentham did have some
reservations about Beccaria;114 but on the whole, those pale in
comparison to the debt Bentham properly acknowledged. In fact,
Bentham took pains to express how much Beccaria had contributed to
his own intellectual development. Speaking of Beccaria, Bentham
exclaimed:
Oh my master, first evangelist of Reason, you who have raised
your Italy so far above England. . . [Y]ou who have made so
many useful excursions into the path of utility, what is there left
for us to do? —Never to turn aside from that path.115
But in Bentham’s work, the relationship between political
economy and the criminal sanction had radically changed. The penal
sphere had been pushed outside political economy and served the
function of a police barricade: the bulk of economic exchange was
113
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viewed as orderly, voluntary, and tending toward the common good;
only in the case of deviance did the state step in, using the mechanisms
of punishment to regulate human conduct. The penal sanction was
marked off from the dominant logic of economics as the only space
where those older notions of public economy prevailed.
This vision of an ordered market delimited by the penal sanction
dominates the public imagination today. We tend to view criminal law as
the exceptional extremity to an otherwise unregulated orderly market,
where there—and there alone—the state must intervene to calibrate the
calculations of rational actors. This is reflected in the pervasive idea that
fraud and coercion are the one major exception to unregulated markets. It
is this precisely combination—order in the market and government at the
border—that helped shape the modern neoliberal vision of penality. This
is the view of Richard Posner, eloquently formulated on the front-piece
of this manuscript and reproduced here:
The major function of criminal law in a capitalist society is to
prevent people from bypassing the system of voluntary,
compensated exchange—the “market,” explicit or implicit—in
situations where, because transaction costs are low, the market is
a more efficient method of allocating resources than forced
exchange… When transaction costs are low, the market is,
virtually by definition, the most efficient method of allocating
resources. Attempts to bypass the market will therefore be
discouraged by a legal system bent on promoting efficiency.116
In this passage, the idea of market efficiency leads into a penal
theory akin to legal despotism: the only legitimate space where
government can intervene is in the penal sphere. Elsewhere, it must leave
alone voluntary, compensated exchanges—as if the space of the market
existed somehow independently of the policing, as if the two domains
were distinct. Richard Posner’s idea that crime can be defined as that
which is not naturally efficient maps on remarkably to the Physiocratic
idea that the homme pervers—the perverted man—is the one who does
not abide by the natural order of the universe. Posner’s vision of the
criminal law is incipient in the writings of the Physiocrats. Neoliberal
116
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penality traces to the legal despotism of François Quesnay and Le
Mercier de la Rivière.
The new discourse of neoliberal penality facilitates the growth of
the penal sphere. It makes it easier to resist government intervention in
the marketplace and to embrace criminalizing any and all deviations
from the market. It facilitates passing new criminal statutes and wielding
the penal sanction more liberally—because that is where administration
is necessary; that is where the state can legitimately act; that is the
proper sphere of policing. In other words, the neoliberal vision not only
goes hand-in-hand with a certain way of perceiving markets and
history—of believing, for instance, that the early markets of the
eighteenth century were regulated excessively and that ours today are
free. It also facilitates the growth of the penal sphere. By marginalizing
and pushing punishment to the outskirts of the market, the neoliberal
discourse fertilizes the penal sphere.
Modern penal practices in the West are consistent with this,
though I must emphasize that my intention is neither to make, nor to
demonstrate a causal empirical link. The size and the cost of our
neoliberal penal sphere in the West far exceeds those of earlier
periods.117 In the United States, for instance, the twentieth century
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experienced very high rates and costs of institutionalization—in both
prisons and asylums. Prison populations skyrocketed beginning in 1970,
rising from under 200,000 persons to more than 1.3 million in 2002. That
year, our prison rate surpassed for the first time the 600 mark—600
inmates per 100,000 adults. Including inmates in jail, the incarcerated
population exceeded two million in 2001. In the 1930s, 40s and 50s, the
United States also institutionalized people at high rates, but in state and
county mental hospitals, institutions for “mental defectives and
epileptics” and “the mentally retarded,” psychiatric wards in VA
hospitals, as well as “psychopathic,” city, and private mental hospitals.
When the data on these mental institutions are combined with the data on
prison rates for 1928 through 2000, the rates of overall
institutionalization in this country are staggering: in the period between
1935 and 1963, the United States consistently institutionalized (in mental
institutions and prisons) at rates above 700 per 100,000 adults—with
highs of 778 in 1939 and 786 in 1955.
In 2001, the fifty states spent a combined $38 billion on prisons
alone.118 These numbers continue to rise sharply. California's annual
prison budget for 2007-08 was almost $10 billion dollars in 2007, nearly
twice as large as it was in 2001.119 For many states, the annual budget
allocates more funding for prisons than for education.120 The numbers
are often staggering. According to a study released by the Department of
Justice in 2004:
Correctional authorities spent $38.2 billion to maintain the
Nation’s State correctional systems in fiscal year 2001, including
$29.5 billion specifically for adult correctional facilities. Day-today operating expenses totaled $28.4 billion, and capital outlays
for land, new building, and renovations, $1.1 billion. The average
118
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annual operating cost per State inmate in 2001 was $22,650, or
$62.05 per day. Among facilities operated by the Federal Bureau
of Prisons, it was $22,632 per inmate, or $62.01 per day.121
With about one percent of the adult population in the United
States behind bars, the size and cost of our penal sphere is undoubtedly
greater than it was in earlier periods. And by “penal sphere,” I do not
mean to create or reify a new category. I only mean to denote the costs
and human capital associated with the criminal sanction. Those costs and
that human capital are exceedingly large. This is consistent with the
neoliberal penal vision: we are far more willing to spend dollars and
allow the state to intervene in the penal sphere than we are in education
or elsewhere, because that is where the government has a legitimate role.
The federal bailouts of 2008 represent an exception to this logic;122 but
they are exceptional and, in that sense, they prove the rule. Both sides of
the political spectrum view the bailouts as “outrageous,” though
necessary in a time of crisis to boost public confidence in the financial
markets and ensure the continuing flow of credit to American
homeowners.123 Most believe that the bailouts are temporary measures
that will be followed by a return to normal. Even the New York Times
editorial page assumes, for instance, that the nationalized Fannie and
Freddie enterprises will eventually be privatized again.124
I must emphasize that I am not making a causal claim. I do not
contend that it is the discourse of neoliberalism that has fueled the
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growth of our prison populations. It is not the logic that has caused mass
incarceration; the war on drugs, the embrace of selective incapacitation
theory, mandatory minimum sentences, and other practices are directly
responsible for the exponential growth of our prisons, as other factors
were directly responsible for the expansion of asylums and institutions
for “the mentally defective.” My point, instead, is that the logic of
neoliberalism facilitates these punishment practices by encouraging the
belief that the legitimate space for government intervention is in the
penal sphere—and there alone. The empirical evidence is at least
consistent with this genealogy and does not, straight out, nullify the
hypothesis.

VII.

Second. The rhetoric of neoliberalism naturalizes the market and thereby
hides the massive redistribution that takes place there. It masks the
state’s role, the state’s ties to non-state associations—associations such
as the Chicago Board of Trade—and the extensive legal and regulatory
framework that encases those associations. But is also hides the freedom
that existed before. In other words, it masks both the amount of freedom
in the earlier eighteenth century and the amount of regulation today.
On the one hand, there was far more “freedom” in the Parisian
markets of the eighteenth century than we tend to acknowledge today.
The ordinances and royal edicts were perceived as freedom enhancing by
their defenders, especially Delamare and cameralists such as Beccaria.
But even setting that aside, there were so many of these rules and
regulations that they were, in fact, ineffective and hardly enforced. As
Professor Olivier-Martin suggests, “the police regulations were
innumerable under the ancient régime… and as a result, the relative
impotence of the police is well established.”125 This is a phenomenon we
know well in the criminal law context, where there has been such a
proliferation of penal statutes that most are not enforced regularly and
those that are, are often used for selective prosecutions. The Parisian
ordinances were enforced mostly during times of scarcity, and there is
good reason to believe that what the police was trying to achieve, more
125
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than anything, was the appearance that they were doing something in
response to a crisis. It should come as no surprise that during times of
crisis, the state would intervene a bit more; that is precisely what
happens in modern neoliberal states, such as in the United States during
the savings and loan crisis or with the 2008 bailouts. Those
interventions, while they temporarily weaken the claim that markets selfadjust, are fleeting and have little impact on the discourse of
neoliberalism.
But even more important, the police matters in eighteenth century
Paris were trivial. They involved fines only, and mostly minor fines, and
triggered relatively minimal process. The police jurisdiction was
essentially a civil, not a criminal, matter and for most of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries was part of the civil chamber. At various times,
such as during the reforms of the Bureau de Police of 1572, the police
was reduced essentially to street cleaning.126 The history of the founding
of the police chamber reflects its secondary status. Louix XIV, after
taking power in his own hands, turned first to finances, but then to
justice and police matters. He created two special sessions of his council,
one for matters of justice and one for matters of police. The first, the
council on justice, he presided over himself on numerous occasions. It
produced in 1667 the codification of rules of civil procedure, what was
referred to as ‘ordonnance civile’, as well as, in 1670, the codification of
criminal procedure—‘l’ordonnance criminelle.’ The second council on
police, we know far less about, because it received so much less attention
and Louis XIV never presided over the sessions. It was simply far less
important.127 Louis XIV ultimately carved out the police chamber from
within the civil lieutenant’s job description and second-seated the
lieutenant de police.128 “The lieutenant de police will seat ordinarily at
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the Châtelet in the chamber dite Chambre civile, and will dispose of a
small office adjacent.”129 The police of the Châtelet was by no means
what we could consider a criminal jurisdiction, levied only minor fines,
if that, and took a second seat to both the criminal chamber and the civil
chamber.
A review of the archives of the Châtelet of Paris at the National
Archives of France, the Série Y, reveals that the leading recurring
violation that the commissioners noted on their rounds was the failure to
sweep one’s storefront—the entry read “non balayé.” The papers,
reports, and records of the police chamber read like those of a small
claims court and present predominantly trivial matters. For instance, the
carton of papers for the first six months of 1758—the carton labeled
Y9459/A—contains month-by-month reports of the daily activity of the
police commissioners and lists all the violations — the contraventions —
that the commissioners observed. Most of the contraventions are for
failure to sweep the side-walk. They read as follows: “Police des 8 et 9
février 1758: Le devant de la porte du cabaret au merle blanc non balayé.
Rue des francs Bourgeois: Le devant du cabaret de tardif aux fontaines
de bourgogne non balayé.” And the list of “non balayé” goes on and on,
interspersed with violations for individuals found gaming or drinking in
cabarets past the closing hour. Here is the report of commissioner
Dubuisson, returned at the audience of the police chamber on July 21,
1758, archived in carton Y9459/B which covered the last six months of
1758—a relatively typical entry:
8 July 1758 – no violations
10 said month – no violations
11 said month – no violations
12 s.m. – 3 cases of failure to sweep the street
13 – nothing
14 – nothing
15 – nothing
17 – nothing
18 said month of July – 4 cases of failure to sweep
19 s.m. – 8 cases of failure to sweep
l’exception de ce qui concerne la police Il précèdera le lieutenant de police dans toutes
les assemblées, mais sans aucune dépendance ni autorité de l’un sur l’autre. » (104).
129
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20 s.m. – nothing
Here is the report of the same commissioner Dubuisson submitted to the
police chamber the following week, July 28, 1758 :
21 July – no violations
22 same month – vehicle without plates or a number blocking
public access ; stones left in disarray by a master mason blocking
the streams ; neglected mound of gravel ; 2 cases of failure to
sweep
24 – nothing
25 – nothing
26 – wood and stones blocking the public way ; 4 cases of failure
to sweep;
28 s.m. – 3 cases of neglected gravel ; manure causing bad
odors ; garbage thrown in our presence from the window of the
second floor of the house occupied by the baker near the rue de
la tinerandrie ; failure to sweep.
No need to belabor the point: the records reflect predominantly minor
and trivial violations when they reflect any at all. The contrast with the
records of the criminal jurisdiction of the Châtelet of Paris is striking. A
review of the carton for January and February 1760—carton Y9650—
discloses far more serious cases, with lengthy informations,
interrogatories, and long indictments with numerous witnesses. The
process and types of cases in the criminal files make the police chamber
look like child’s play.
Moreover, a careful review of the sentences meted out by the
police chamber of the Châtelet reveals that the police des grains
constituted a minor function of the chamber’s jurisdiction. These are
preliminary findings from a larger on-going quantitative study of a
collection of 932 sentences and ordinances from the police chamber
meted out over the period 1668 to 1787, contained in two cartons, Y9498 and 9499 at the National Archives.130 Of the 932 records, 580 are
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police sentences, and of those, only 77 or 8.40% are related in some way
to the cultivation and commerce of grain, to the market in grains, to
bakers, millers, or other activities that have a bearing on bread, flour, or
grain; with another 27 or 2.94% very tangentially related or touching in
any way whatsoever on grain or bread. Of the 77 relevant sentences, only
sixty resulted in fines. Within the category of the highest fines meted
out—3,000 livres or more—grain-related offenses represented a small
fraction of the whole, only 2 (or 5.4%) of 37 such fines. There was only
one sentence of imprisonment meted out in the entire period, and it was
for a servant who did not deliver goods—unrelated to the grain trade. I
will be conducting far more research on this sample, but a preliminary
assessment is that the police des grains represented a small fraction of
the business of the lieutenant de police.
Overall, the archival records reveal a disproportionate number of
terribly minor infractions and a relatively small place for the police des
grains. As noted earlier, most of our knowledge of the Parisian grain and
bread markets comes to us primarily through the eyes of liberal
opponents of the regulations—Freminville and Afanassiev. They did a
skilled job of picking out the sentences related to the police des grains
from the haystack of police records. But we should be weary that so
much of our understanding of the police des grains is filtered through the
lens of these opponents—which seems to have produced such a morbid
fascination with regimentation. Our perceptions of the importance of
grain regulation may well be distorted by the personal biases of the
historians and narrators of the field, either because they were
ideologically opposed to the police des grains and had an interest in
inflating the appearance of excessive regulation, or because they were
themselves commissioners or lieutenants of the police—such as
Delamare—and invested in the importance of their own functions.
On the other hand, there is also far more “constraint” in our
contemporary markets than we typically tend to acknowledge today. The
truth is, every action of the broker, buyer, seller, investment bank,
exactly how this collection was compiled since it does not contain all of the sentences
and ordinances. There are several existing theories as to how the items were collected
and they each impact differently on the randomness of the sampling. More on this soon,
I hope. For the moment, I am going on the assumption that the items are relatively
randomly sampled, though that ultimately may not be the case.
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brokerage firm, exchange member—even non-member—is scrutinized
and regulated. The rules, oversight committees, advisory letters,
investigations, as well as the legal actions, abound. The list of do’s and
don’ts is extensive. Brokerage firms may combine and use black-lists to
restrict retail buyers from reselling their public offering stock during a
“retail restricted period” of between 30 and 90 days following their
purchase of newly offered stock, but the same brokerage firms may
allow large institutions to dump their stock in the aftermarket at any
time.131 Exchange members on the New York Stock Exchange may get
together and fix the commission rate on stock transactions of less than
$500,000—i.e. set the price of buying and selling stock—but freely
negotiate commissions in larger stock transactions.132 The National
Association of Securities Dealers may combine and agree to restrict the
sale and fix the resale price of securities of open-end management
companies—“mutual funds”—in the secondary market between dealers,
between dealers and investors, and between investors, thereby
eliminating the secondary market in mutual funds—a market which was
significant prior to 1940;133 and competing corporate take-over bidders
may join together and make joint take-over offers to stockholders, even
if it means that together they reduce the offering price for the stock
purchase.134 But exchange members may not get together and disallow
exchange members to share commissions earned from the purchase or
sale of stock with non-member broker-dealers;135 and an exchange may
not order its members to remove private telephone connections to the
offices of nonmember brokers—unless the Securities and Exchange
Committee reviews and approves such a policy.136
The rules and regulations surrounding our modern markets are
intricate and often arcane, and they belie the simplistic idea that our
markets are “free.” The reality is far more complex. It is interesting to
note that this may also have been true with regard to the actual practices
of the Physiocrats. They may have been far more constrained in their
actions than they were in their rhetoric. This is certainly true of Le
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Mercier de la Rivière, who served as intendant—administrative
governor—of Martinique on two occasions during the early 1760s. By
the time Mercier returned to Martinique on his second tour of duty in
1763, he knew François Quesnay and had been converted to
Physiocracy. In fact, Quesnay had originally recommended Mercier for
the post in Martinique in 1759.137 At a time, then, when Mercier was
preaching free markets, he was in fact practicing the police des grains.
He was setting the price of bread and meat in Martinique, as evidenced
by this fascinating ordinance signed by Mercier himself in 1763:
No 271. Ordinance of MM., the General and Intendant (royal
administrator), increasing the price of bread. September 24,
1763.
The current price of wheat flour making it impossible for
bakers to provide bread to the public at the specified price of 7
sols 6 deniers per pound, at the ordinary weight of 16 ounces, we
order that from this day forward, bakers will be held to furnish
their bread at the weight of 14 ounces for 7 sols 6 deniers, and
this shall continue until otherwise ordered by us…
We promulgate this to the king’s prosecutors, etc.
Rendered at Martinique, September 24, 1763.
Signed, Marquis de Fenelon, et De La Rivière138

Like Mercier de la Rivière, we today want to see freedom even
when there is nothing but constraint in front of us. That desire, that urge
to believe is precisely what masks the redistribution that accompanies the
actual administration of contemporary markets. Because we want to
believe that the markets are operating on their own, we let slide the
actual cash flows and fail to properly scrutinize how the administration
of the markets actually redistributes wealth. Because we want to believe
in self-adjusting markets, we do not adequately investigate the
consequences of our choices. There is a paragraph in the standard
commodities futures contract on the Chicago Board of Trade that
137
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provides that all grain shall be delivered in the City of Chicago. The City
of Chicago has a finite capacity for warehousing grain, and is at a good
distance from the corn, wheat, and soybean fields of Nebraska. That may
increase the relative costs for the Nebraska farmer. The mere existence
of standardized commodities futures contracts—which were first
permitted in the twentieth century—tends to slightly reduce the mean
price of commodities. This too may work to the detriment of the
producer. These are some of the distributional consequences that go
unexamined, precisely because we do not want to see all the choices that
organize the market—because the market has been naturalized. The idea
of natural order and, today, of market efficiency obfuscates these
redistributions of wealth and resources.

VIII.

A word on method. I am by no means the first to toil in these fields and
this project owes much to the ground-breaking work of Louis Dumont,
Albert Hirschman, Karl Polanyi, Joseph Schumpeter, Luc Boltanski, and
Michel Foucault, who have all contributed in important ways to our
understanding of late modern capitalism. The objective of this particular
project may be different, but naturally builds on their insights. This study
seeks to explore the mode of rationality that made neoliberalism
“natural” today—that naturalized our conception of the penal sphere as
the outer limit of the free market, as the unique location where
government intervention is automatically legitimate. The goal is not to
offer a historical explanation why this mode of rationality developed, nor
to propose a material explanation—whether economic or political—as to
how the idea of natural order emerged. It is instead to trace how certain
beliefs—for instance, the idea that the Parisian markets were
overregulated and that our modern exchanges are free—became
believable. How they became so obvious. And at what price.
Let me emphasize this last question—at what price—in part by
drawing a contrast to Albert Hirschman’s brilliant essay, The Passions
and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism before Its Triumph.
In his essay, Hirschman demonstrates how ideas evolve over time and
argues that the “spirit of capitalism” grew and changed from within. The
process, Hirschman argues, was “endogenous” to the reasoning and
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rationality of the period. In contrast to Marxian analyses, which trace the
emergence of capitalism to changes in material processes and class
structures—to the end of feudal land relations and the rise of new modes
of production—and in contrast to Weber, who traced the rise of
capitalism to a new ethic of Protestantism, Hirschman traces a more
continuous or seamless history of ideas, wherein self-interest came to be
perceived as the useful passion that could be counted upon to rein in the
less productive passions—like the passion for glory or lust. The theory of
interests—and especially, the theories of self-interest represented in the
“private vices-public virtues” of Mandeville and the “hidden hand” of
Adam Smith—evolved as one conceivable way, a more auspicious way
of dealing with excessive cultures of glory and passions such as lust. The
other means that had been developed—such as repression of the passions
or rehabilitation of the passions—were discussed, but seemed less likely
to succeed than to pit one passion against the others.
Hirschman’s story traces the history of how an idea became
popular, and I embrace that method in one sense—insofar as this project
too explores how the idea of natural order became dominant in our
contemporary neoliberal imagination. At the same time, however, this
project seeks to push the analysis further; to explore how the acceptance
of those beliefs—beliefs in natural order and legal despotism—affects
our contemporary social distributions. In other words, at what price?
Ways of reasoning and seeing the world, I contend, facilitate certain
material developments—whether inadvertently or knowingly. They
make possible, they ease certain types of redistribution. We come to
believe certain ideas, as Hirschman demonstrates well, but those beliefs
have significant consequences.139 It is crucial not to lose sight of those.
At the same time, however, I acknowledge the limitations of pure
idealism: I do not believe that ideas have such real impacts on the world
that they themselves or alone necessarily transform our practices. I do
not believe that a new idea can change the way we produce, the way we
work, the amount of work we do. I am not Weberian in the hard sense of
139
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The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Although this project
focuses predominantly on the development of the ideas of natural order
and legal despotism, and on their potential impact on our social
distributions, this is not to deny the important influence of material
changes, economic and technological shifts, and political transformation.
The project does not centrally address those larger material
transformations. That would simply be another project. In this sense, this
project is neither merely a history of ideas nor an intellectual history, but
also not a material explanation of how ideas evolve over time. It is
instead a tracing—I might say genealogy—of how a certain set of beliefs
became common and an analysis of how those beliefs might influence
our practices.
Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello’s The New Spirit of Capitalism
is particularly enlightening in this respect. Boltanski and Chiapello’s
work focuses precisely on the intersection of how new ideas—in their
case, the 1960’s artistic and creativity critiques of fordist capitalism, with
its principles of hierarchical organization—reshaped work practices into
more fluid networks with greater roles for individual initiative,
creativity, and autonomy, and thereby helped neutralize the thrust of the
original critiques themselves. Boltanski and Chiapello take seriously
how new ideas translate into practices, conducting a close reading of
modern business management manuals to demonstrate how the ideas
permeated the reasoning of management and influenced institutional
organization.
Michel Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France in 1978 and
1979 are also enlightening. Not only did Foucault specifically address
the Parisian bread markets of the eighteenth century, the birth of
Physiocratic thought, and post-War American neoliberalism—including
the seminal work on crime and punishment that Gary Becker penned in
1968—but he also related neoliberal thought back to the early
development of public economy. In his method too, Foucault drew, at
least on one reading, on an age-old strain of nominalist thought that
influences my work as well—a strain of thought that runs through the
work of thinkers as far back as the Medieval Franciscan friar William of
Occam, to the sixteenth century Renaissance essays of Michel de
Montaigne, to the nineteenth century polemics of Friedrich Nietzsche.
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This project continues in the furrow of that lengthy nominalist
tradition. It starts by conceptualizing “natural order” and “market
efficiency” as what William of Occam would have called “universals,”
and then explores what work those universals are accomplishing. The
answer that I develop in these pages reflects this nominalist influence:
we have developed and deployed these universals to make sense of what
are in fact irreducibly individual phenomena, to place discreet and
divergent practices into a coherent framework, to deploy simple heuristic
devices or stereotypes to expedite our evaluation and judgment. In so
doing so, we have created structures of meaning that do work for us—at
a steep price.
The historian, Paul Veyne, in his recent book Foucault: Sa
pensée, sa personne (2008), excavates a similar nominalist influence in
the work of Foucault, drawing particular attention to the opening passage
of Foucault’s 1979 lectures, Naissance de la biopolitique.140 In that
opening lecture, Foucault steps back to explain and reframe his larger
intellectual project and to place his writings within a methodological
framework. The method in all his work, Foucault explains, had always
been to start by doing away with the central explanatory concept, as a
way to reexamine the work that the concept accomplished. Foucault
lectured:
I start from the decision, both theoretical and methodological,
which consists in saying: suppose that the universals do not exist,
and then I ask the question to history and historians: how can you
write the history if you do not admit a priori that something like
the state, society, the sovereign, subjects exist? It is the same
question that I posed when I asked: … suppose that madness
does not exist.141
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The use of the term “universals” is revealing and, as Paul Veyne
suggests, the passage links Foucault back to the tradition of
nominalism.142 Foucault’s method was to critically examine the very
conceptions that we construct in order to learn something about
ourselves.143 Foucault’s nominalism was fed, in part, by a large dose of
skepticism—especially, of skepticism of the constructs of others, of
those many universals. It is in this sense that Veyne correctly
characterizes Foucault as a skeptic144—although it is important to keep
nominalism and skepticism distinct and separate. In a similar vein, this
project asks: suppose that “natural order” or “market efficiency” does not
exist. What does that tell us about the way that we now understand the
world? What work do those concepts perform? These questions too are
nominalist and build on a centuries-old tradition of thought.
Although this project shares a methodological sensibility with
Foucault, this project breaks sharply from his analysis. More than
anyone, Foucault reified the idea that the police des grains under the
ancient régime was regulated excessively and he also strongly intimated
that the modern economic sphere has been liberalized. Even though
Foucault’s overarching project was to show that both were forms of
governance, Foucault nevertheless created and deployed categories in a
manner that is completely antithetical to this project. In his 1978
lectures, Michel Foucault specifically deployed the category of discipline
in its purest, most pristine form, to describe the grain trade.
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La police des grains, Foucault explained in his lecture of January
18, 1978, is the quintessential example of discipline and satisfies all three
dimensions of the concept, discipline. First, the centripetal nature of
disciplinary force: as Foucault explained, “discipline functions to the
extent that it isolates a space, that it determines a segment. Discipline
concentrates, focuses, and encloses. The first action of discipline is in
fact to circumscribe a space in which its power and the mechanisms of
its power will function fully and without limit.”145 La police des grains
was centripetal precisely in this sense, Foucault maintained. It turns
inward onto a determined space and seeks to control, to dominate that
circumscribed field. “It isolates, it concentrates, it encloses, it is
protectionist, and it focuses essentially on action on the market or on the
space of the market and what surrounds it.”146
Second, the exhaustive nature of discipline: it seeks to regulate
everything, to the smallest and most minute details. “Discipline allows
nothing to escape,” Foucault explained. “Not only does it not allow
things to run their course, its principle is that things, the smallest things,
must not be abandoned to themselves. The smallest infraction of
discipline must be taken up with all the more care for it being small.”147
This is the notion of discipline as order maintenance.148 The police des
grains is precisely about letting nothing escape the view of regulation,
Foucault declared.
Third, the prohibitive nature of discipline. “How basically does
discipline, like systems of legality, proceed?” Foucault asked. “Well,
they divide everything according to a code of the permitted and the
forbidden. Then, within these two fields of the permitted and the
forbidden, they specify and precisely define what is forbidden and what
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is permitted, or rather, what is obligatory.”149 Again, the police des
grains could not come closer, Foucault maintained. It seeks to define
these two spheres and then determine exactly which types of commercial
behaviors are allowed and which prohibited.
Foucault, more than anyone, reified the idea that the Parisian
markets were excessively regulated with his use of the expression, “la
police disciplinaire des grains”: “if we take again the example of the
disciplinary police of grain as it existed until the middle of the eighteenth
century, as set out in hundreds of pages in Delamare’s Traité de la
police, we see that the disciplinary police of grain is in fact
centripetal.”150 This project seeks precisely to demystify that claim.
Similarly, with regard to modern markets, Foucault also reified
the difference with the ancient régime. To describe modern market
practices, Foucault abandoned the paradigm of discipline and fashioned a
new category: sécurité. In his 1979 lectures, Naissance de la
Biopolitique, Foucault analyzed the modern mode of rationality, which
he called “liberalism,” under the rubric of sécurité—what he later called
“gouvernementalité.”151 In his lectures, Foucault traced liberalism to the
idea of “laissez-nous faire”: the idea of a self-limitation on governance.
Liberal practices are characterized, according to Foucault, by explicit
self-limitation, in contrast to the “raison d’État” of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, which sought an infinite objective. It is the project
of “not governing too much,” in the words of Benjamin Franklin and the
marquis d’Argenson.152 It traces back, Foucault said, to the birth of
political economy: “Political economy, I think is fundamentally what has
ensured the auto-limitation of governmental reason.”153 Listen to that:
l’autolimitation de la raison gouvernementale. Even for Foucault, one of
the sharpest critics of neoliberalism, there is a tangible substratum of
liberty at play. There are new practices of liberalization. There are free
movements and processes of free circulation of goods. “[L]iberalism –
not interfering, allowing free movement, letting things follow their
149
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course; laisser faire, passer et aller – basically and fundamentally means
acting so that reality develops, goes its way, and follows its own course
according to the laws, principles, and mechanism of reality itself.”154
It is this “auto-limitation” that leads Foucault to name and deploy
the new category of sécurité, which is different precisely in those three
ways from discipline. First, whereas discipline cabined, concentrated,
and enclosed its space of operation, sécurité is centrifugal: “The
apparatuses of security . . . have the constant tendency to expand; they
are centrifugal. . . . Security therefore involves organizing, or anyway
allowing the development of ever-wider circuits.”155 Second, whereas
discipline focused on even the smallest infractions, sécurité lets the small
things go. “The apparatus of security . . . lets things happen. . . . allowing
prices to rise, allowing scarcity to develop, and letting people go hungry
. . .”156 Third, whereas discipline sought to eliminate and eradicate
completely, sécurité in contrast tries only to minimize—to seek an
optimal level of the targeted behavior, to achieve a certain equilibrium.
Not to eliminate, but to regulate to an optimal level. Sécurité is
pragmatic. It tries to figure out how to optimize. In sum, sécurité differs
dramatically from discipline in its modes of functioning. For Foucault,
the practices differ in fact. As Foucault explained: “An apparatus of
security . . . cannot operate well except on condition that it is given
freedom, in the modern sense that it acquires in the eighteenth century:
no longer the exemptions and privileges attached to a person, but the
possibility of movement, change of place, and processes of circulation of
both people and things.”157
My project is markedly different. The point is not to show that
both the police des grains and neoliberalism are both forms of
governmentality, but rather to show that neither can be categorized in
those ways and that the categories of overly-disciplined and liberalized
themselves are meaningless and obfuscate the real work that needs to be
done. In this project, it is crucial to distinguish and carefully delineate
practice from rhetoric—though they may well both constitute
discourse—and to make sure we know exactly which one we are
154
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describing and comparing. It is, for example, far too easy to discuss
Mercier de la Rivière’s written text, but ignore his actions as intendant of
Martinique. One repeated difficulty with Foucault’s analysis in his 1978
and 1979 lectures is that he contrasts the practices of the police des
grains with the rhetoric of the Physiocrats. Foucault uses the concept of
discipline to understand the practices as opposed to the rhetoric, of the
police des grains; yet he uses the concept of liberalism as a way to
understand the rhetoric of the Physiocrats and ignores their practice. The
trouble is, the rhetoric of the police des grains was different than its
practice, and the practices of the liberals were often different than their
rhetoric. There is a sense that Foucault took neoliberals too much at their
word. It is almost as if he suggested that liberal practices were in fact
more liberal but that they should be understood as just another form of
governmentality.
This project is premised on the belief that we have no way of
knowing whether our contemporary practices are more or less liberal,
more or less freedom enhancing, more or less regulated. We have far
more administration today than meets the eye or that we tend to
recognize. Whether it amounts to more or less is impossible to quantify.
But the fact is, we characterize these contemporary practices as more
liberal—which is precisely the problem.

IX.

Under

the entry “Grains” of the Encyclopédie volume published in
1758, François Quesnay proposed that “It is quite sufficient that the
government simply not interfere with industry,” “suppress the
prohibitions and prejudicial constraints on internal commerce and
reciprocal external trade,” “abolish or diminish tolls and transport
charges,” and “extinguish the privileges levied on commerce by the
provinces.”158 Quesnay’s vision of an economic system governed by
natural order led to a political theory of “legal despotism” that would
radically unbundle the earlier understanding of a overlapping
relationship between public economy and the penal sphere. By relegating
the state to the margins of the market and giving it free rein there and
158
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there alone, the idea of natural order facilitated the unrestrained
expansion of the penal sphere. It gave birth to neoliberal penality.
The hitch is that the foundational categories of, on the one hand,
“natural order,” “market efficiency,” or “the free market,” and, on the
other hand, “excessive regulation,” “governmental inefficiency,” or
“discipline,” are illusory and misleading categories that fail to capture
the irreducibly individual phenomena of different forms of market
organization. In all markets, the state is present. Naturally, it is present
when it fixes the price of a commodity such as wheat or bread. But it is
also present when it subsidizes the cultivation or production of wheat,
when it grants a charter to the Chicago Board of Trade, when it permits
trading of an instrument like a futures contract, when it protects the
property interests of wheat wholesalers, when it facilitates the river
transport of wheat, when it criminalizes the coordination of prices, when
it allows the merger of grain companies, when it polices the timing of
trades, etc. In addition, whenever the government is not itself regulating
a market, it implicitly or explicitly delegates that authority to another
entity. All markets are highly regulated. At the same time, in all markets,
there is freedom. Even in a controlled economy where the price is fixed,
there are variations in the quality of the goods sold and along other
dimensions that create product differentiation. These produce cues at
certain stores and not at others. Even in a highly criminalized economy
where certain goods are outlawed, there are black markets that emerge
and develop into robust trading markets where those illegal goods can be
purchased and sold.
In the economic sphere, there is freedom and there is constraint.
What we see is a reflection on us, not of the market. It makes little sense
to describe one regime as free and another as regulated. All systems have
complicated regulatory mechanisms that make the market function and
dysfunction. What is most important is to remember that the categories
we use to organize, understand, discuss, categorize, and compare the
different organizing principles are just that—labels. They do not capture
the true individuality of the objects described. And they have the
unfortunate effect of obscuring rather than enlightening. They obscure by
making one set of objects seem natural and necessary, and the other
naturally unnecessary.
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This essay is a prolegomenon, a necessary first step in the
direction of properly assessing modern forms of social and economic
organization. Necessary, because of the deafening and dominant
discourse of natural order and market efficiency. The very idea that we
would use the term “free” to describe our current market system—a
system which is regulated through and through—is a testament to the
work that needs to be done. It may be fair to say that the Chicago School
has so deeply and fundamentally warped our understanding of economic
systems that it will take a lot of work to reach the point where we can
properly assess different alternatives for the administration of markets
and punishment, and dismantle our neoliberal penality.
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